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ABSTRACT
The Department of Energy’s Idaho National Laboratory, under its 
programmatic responsibility for managing the University Research Reactor 
Conversions, has completed the conversion of the reactor at the Texas A&M 
University Nuclear Science Center Reactor. With this work completed and in 
anticipation of other impending conversion projects, INL convened and engaged 
the project participants in a structured discussion to capture the lessons learned. 
This lessons learned process has allowed us to capture gaps, opportunities, and 
good practices, drawing from the project team’s experiences. These lessons will 
be used to raise the standard of excellence, effectiveness, and efficiency in all 
future conversion projects. 
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University Reactor Conversion 
Lessons Learned Workshop for  
Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL), under its programmatic 
responsibility for managing the University Research Reactor Conversions, has completed the conversion 
of the reactor at the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center (TAMU NSC). This project was 
successfully completed through an integrated and collaborative effort involving INL, Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL), DOE (headquarters and the field office), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
the universities, and the contractors involved in analyses, fuel design and fabrication, and spent nuclear 
fuel (SNF) shipping and disposition. With this work completed and in anticipation of other impending 
conversion projects, INL convened and engaged the project participants in a structured discussion to 
capture the lessons learned. The objectives of this meeting were to capture the observations, insights, 
issues, concerns, and ideas of those involved in the reactor conversions so that future efforts can be 
conducted with greater effectiveness, efficiency, and with fewer challenges. 
2. BACKGROUND 
As part of the Bush administration’s effort to reduce the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material 
worldwide, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has established a program to convert 
research reactors from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. 
The research reactor conversion effort is a critical step under the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative’s Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program. As part of this program, NNSA 
is minimizing the use of HEU in civilian nuclear programs by converting research reactors and 
radioisotope production processes to the use of LEU fuel and targets. The HEU is weapons-grade nuclear 
material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb. The research reactors are secure and 
are used for peaceful purposes; however, by converting these reactors to use LEU, a significant step is 
made toward ensuring that weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and safeguarded. 
Among the list of research reactors targeted for conversion in 2006 were the University of Florida 
and Texas A&M University. 
Reactor conversions include analyses, LEU fuel fabrication, reactor defuel and refuel activities, 
HEU packaging and transportation, and reactor startup. 
3. LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS 
The process for capturing the lessons learned from this project involved taking the schedule of the 
project activities and focusing feedback and discussion on each respective activity. The feedback and 
lessons learned discussions were held in an open discussion workshop, including all participating team 
members and their representatives. To promote a more expedient discussion at the workshops and to help 
the project team focus on the higher priority areas, a survey was developed and sent to project participants 
before the workshops. The survey invited those involved in the project to score and offer comments with 
regard to the projects activities in which they were involved. The survey was formatted with a 5-point 
Likert scale, where 1 was low or “extremely challenging,” and 5 was high or “exceptional.” The surveys 
1
were collected and scores were entered and averaged for each activity. The average score for each activity 
is identified in Section 6 of this document. 
Based on survey scores and comments, the workshop agenda was established and timeframes were 
estimated. Consistent with expectations based on the survey results, the workshop discussions were brief 
for the unremarkable areas and more extended and detailed in those areas of greatest significance. The 
detailed lessons learned were captured and the themes and general conclusions were then drawn. The 
general conclusions and themes tend to apply to all activities (almost as operating principles) and will 
benefit future project teams and project managers. The more detailed lessons learned align to given 
activities and apply to the project manager and those involved in the given activity, as that activity is 
undertaken.
4. LESSONS LEARNED 
4.1 General Conclusions 
This project was clearly a success. Nonetheless, there were many detailed lessons learned regarding 
both technical and project management aspects. The specifics are provided in the following sections; 
however, some general elements are key to the success of future conversion and spent fuel shipping 
projects. Future projects will be conducted most effectively, efficiently, and with a minimum of risks, 
interference, and interruptions if the following are an integral part of the project: 
x Project team composition, which includes a project team composed of individuals who are critical 
thinkers, flexible, and committed to the project results (the following was extracted from the 
comments submitted: “Having the right people who were willing to buy into the common vision 
and mission was critical. Everyone had a great personal work ethic. Having a single person who is 
solely dedicated to the project [allowing that person to stay in contact with all parties involved and 
to identify and track issues] was instrumental in the success of the project.”). 
x Communication, including inclusive communications and exchange that provides for effective 
sharing of needs, expectations, roles, responsibilities, data, assumptions, schedules, and facility and 
equipment constraints. 
x Use of expertise, including confidence in and effective utilization of the varied expertise and 
experience of the team members. 
x Proactivity and individual levels of initiative. 
x Early initiation includes the earliest possible initiation of planning and activities at every step in 
the project process, thereby minimizing the likelihood of time-critical situations. 
x Verification and re-verification of data, analyses, specs, assumptions, performance expectations, 
and equipment fit and function throughout the project. 
x Clear and common understanding, including clear expectations of roles, responsibilities, 
technical variables, and technical results. 
x Knowledgeable and informed stakeholders who can advocate for the project, remove barriers, 
and support decisions and adjustments needed to ensure project success (e.g., public, political, and 
administrative). 
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x Compile reactor data includes assembly or compilation of the historical documents that reveal 
what is known and unknown about the reactor. 
x Value-added government oversight, in which the public interests are served, objectivity is 
retained, but NRC’s experience and expertise is available to the project. 
The above list comprised the general themes of the lessons learned meeting. The detailed lessons 
learned were discussed in the order of project activities, from initiation to closeout, and are provided in 
the following sections. 
4.2 Lessons Learned Meeting Summary 
The Lessons Learned Workshop for the Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center convened 
on February 21, 2007, at the General Atomics (GA) facilities in San Diego, California. The following 
were attendees at the workshop:
Dana Meyer, INL John Bolin, GA 
Eric Woolstenhulme, INL Jason Yi, GA 
Doug Morrell, INL Ken Mushinski, GA 
Dale Luke, INL Pierre Colomb, CERCA 
Jim Wade, DOE-ID Helios Nadal, CERCA 
Parrish Staples, DOE-NNSA Jim Matos, ANL 
Scott Declue, DOE-SRS Jim Remlinger, TAMU 
Alexander Adams, NRC W Dan Reece, TAMU 
Bill Schuser, NRC Jamie Adam, NAC 
Anthony Veca, GA 
The following was the agenda for the workshop: 
8:00 Welcome and introductory remarks, establish ground rules, and review agenda 
8:30 Presentations 
 TAMU NSC TRIGA Reactor Performance Analysis—TAMU NSC 
 TRIGA Fabrication Process—TRIGA International 
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9:00 Discuss and collect lessons learned by each major activity area 
 Initiating Conversion Project 
 Conversion Proposal Process 
10:15 Break 
10:30 Discuss and collect lessons learned by each major activity area (continued)  
 Fuel and Hardware Development and Procurement 
12:00 Lunch 
1:00 Discuss and collect lessons learned by each major activity area (continued) 
 Core Conversion 
 SNF Shipment 
2:20  Break 
2:35 Discuss and collect lessons learned by each major activity area (continued) 
 Other areas needing to be addressed 
3:35 Next steps and assignments 
4:10 Closing remarks 
4:30 Adjourn 
5. PRESENTATIONS 
5.1 Texas A&M University Nuclear Science Center  
TRIGA Reactor Performance Analysis 
Dr. Dan Reece summarized the TAMU NSC reactor conversion in his presentation. Dr. Reece 
concluded that many things went very well, but there were a few problems. Dr. Reece also gave his 
perspective on the lessons to be learned from the conversion work. Highlights from Dr. Reece’s 
presentation include the following: 
x The difference between calculated values for fuel element temperatures and the actual measured 
values of the new core 
x The apparent conflict between calculated values for neutron fluxes and the fluxes derived from foil 
experiments in the new core 
x The importance of interactions and relationships with the various regulators and conversion team 
members 
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x The importance of planning and coordination for the project 
x The difficulty of locating specific details about the old core. 
5.2 TRIGA Fabrication Process 
This joint presentation covered the ongoing research concerning the difference between the 
calculated values for fuel element temperatures and the actual measured values of the new NSC core. 
Additionally, it was shown that the NSC fuel elements fabricated by CERCA were produced in 
compliance with GA technical specifications and CERCA’s quality assurance requirements. The fuel 
elements were delivered on time and in accordance with the initial manufacturing schedule. 
The process for assembling TRIGA elements was discussed. The point was made that inserting the 
meats into the cladding is a difficult process because of tight cladding tolerances. About 60% of the fuel 
elements must have the fuel meats pressed into the cladding. Only meats and cladding with a large gap 
actually just slide in. 
For the instrumented fuel elements, the meat diameters were within tolerance, but at the small end 
of the ID tolerance. The cladding ID was larger than is allowed per the drawings, but it was determined 
that it was within the safety analysis report specifications and was cleared for use. This configuration 
translated to a larger than nominal gap between the meat and the cladding. This gap reduces heat transfer 
from the meat to the cladding and causes the fuel temperature to be higher than optimal. As the meat 
swells from operating the reactor, the gap will decrease and the temperature will be lower. 
The ostensible decrease in neutron flux was also discussed. The matter needs further investigation 
and foil testing and the results will be documented in a report by GA. 
6. LESSONS LEARNED 
The detailed lessons learned were discussed in order of project activities, from initiation to 
closeout, and are provided in the following sections. 
6.1 Initiating Conversion Project 
6.1.1 Initiation 
The average survey score was 3.88. 
Issues Recommendations 
Some reactor specifications were difficult to 
ascertain and came late in the project. Some of 
this was because the contract with GA was 
finalized later than optimum. 
Early involvement of GA is imperative to better 
understand the core and project implications 
(e.g., fuel and hardware). Also, GA should be 
invited to the reactor early in the process, with 
procurement and analysis aspects being a key 
focus.
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Issues Recommendations 
The initial license amendment followed an old 
example rather than following the NRC guidance 
document, NUREG-1537. This resulted in some 
unnecessary rewriting. 
Follow NUREG-1537 rather than relying on 
previous amendments. Reviewing past requests 
for additional information from NRC may also be 
of benefit. 
6.2 Conversion Proposal Process 
6.2.1 Proposal Preparation 
The average survey score was 2.83. 
Issues Recommendations 
Teamwork is critical to success and efficiency of 
the proposal process. 
An interactive request for additional information 
resolution meeting with all parties involved was a 
key activity. This was much more effective than 
trading phone calls and emails. The face-to-face 
and open, direct communication was key. This 
reduced the required time to complete the process 
by a factor of 10. 
6.2.2 Contract Negotiation 
The average survey score was 3.0. 
Issues Recommendations 
The procurement process on both sides 
(i.e., government and university) is problematic. 
Lack of a mutual understanding in the 
procurement process lends to bogging down the 
process.
Promote communications and negotiations 
between the principle project parties before going 
to the procurement agents. Once the terms are 
understood, then the procurement people can be 
brought in to complete the process. 
Involve both procurement agents early on to 
ensure that time is not lost negotiating differences 
between processes and waiting for additional 
information later. 
Early initiation involvement and coordination of 
contracts/procurement staff are crucial. 
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6.3 Fuel and Hardware Development and Procurement 
6.3.1 Fuel Specifications and Drawings 
The average survey score was 2.20. 
Issues Recommendations 
Specifics about the fuel and hardware 
procurement were confusing because of the varied 
opinions and individual spreadsheets. 
It would be helpful to get everyone together at the 
onset and create a format for presenting the fuel 
and hardware information that everyone agrees to 
and understands. Drawings and other historical 
documents could be presented at the initial 
meeting. The various parties could discuss the 
data to ensure mutual agreement on what needs to 
be ordered. One person could be charged with 
keeping the fuel and hardware spreadsheet 
updated and issued to the interested parties. 
See above recommendation. Also, GA could 
provide information about which upper and lower 
adapters (and other hardware) are required for the 
various cluster types. 
Specifics about the fuel and hardware 
procurement were confusing because no cluster 
assembly information was provided to the 
university. 
The gram loading for the fuel elements was on the 
low end of the required range. 
The project should advise TRIGA International to 
load the elements on the heavy side to maximize 
the amount of fuel in the core. This maximizes the 
per element value when considering the dollars 
spent on fabrication, shipping, usage, and disposal 
of a fuel rod. 
Having the fabrication data for the new fuel 
earlier in the process would be helpful. 
This effort must be worked with the university to 
ensure that all needed information is provided in 
the data packages. 
As a minimum, the data packages should be 
included with the fuel shipment. 
Caution must be taken to properly handle 
proprietary information. 
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6.3.2 Fuel Inspection 
The average survey score was 4.00. 
Issues Recommendations 
The fuel receipt inspection worked well at the 
reactor and at CERCA. 
The right people were involved in the inspection 
(i.e., vendor, quality assurance personnel, and 
receivers). A coordination meeting was held 
before the inspection so that everyone involved 
was well advised and clearly understood their 
rolls. A source inspection was conducted at the 
manufacturer site in France before shipment so 
that the receipt inspection at the university was 
less complex and time intensive. 
After inspection, it was unclear who took 
ownership of the fuel. 
There needs to be a clear transfer of responsibility 
so that it is understood who owns the fuel at any 
given time. A signature process could be devised 
that formally documents and completes the 
ownership transfer. 
6.3.3 Preparation of Facility for Fuel Receipt 
The average survey score was 3.60. 
Issues Recommendations 
Information about the shipping trucks and loading 
configuration is important to expedite the receipt 
of the fuel at the reactor. Ii would be best if the 
trailers had a side-loading capability to make it 
easier to unload the shipments with a forklift. The 
INL should facilitate communications between the 
shipper and reactor. The INL should consider 
writing truck specifications into the contract with 
the shipping company. 
The truck/trailers arrived at NSC with the 
containers positioned toward the front of the 
trailers and with some of the containers turned 
sideways; this precluded access with a pallet jack 
or forklift. 
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6.3.4 Reassembly 
The average survey score was 3.33. 
Issues Recommendations 
It may take specific training to open and 
reassemble the shipping containers for return 
shipment.
Dave Capp at the INL was this person for the 
TAMU NSC project. He did a great job. The INL 
needs to secure a similar individual on all future 
projects.
6.4 Core Conversion 
6.4.1 Fuel Removal 
The average survey score was 3.33. 
Issues Recommendations 
Fuel removal went well at NSC. Video taping of the processes will serve as a great 
resource for those who must perform the tasks 
later.
It may be beneficial to have the core parameters 
measured and documented before the reactor is 
shutdown for refueling (i.e., fuel temperatures, 
neutron flux, and control rod positions). The 
measurements may be useful in analysis following 
restart.
6.4.2 Refueling 
The average survey score was 3.50. 
Issues Recommendations 
Personnel turnover at the universities can 
sometimes cause a loss of drawings, 
specifications, and other documents. This can 
make converting the reactor and SNF shipments a 
significant challenge. 
Early notification of the documentation needs by 
the INL should be made to the university. This 
will allow more time for locating the information. 
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Issues Recommendations 
Hardware for NSC had to be re-machined because 
of lack of information. GA was quick to respond 
to all issues identified; therefore, the issues were 
resolved quickly. 
An early start can also allow time for reactor 
personnel to physically verify reactor components 
before procurement of the parts. 
Because of this issue, we must pay greater 
attention to the details of the reactors. 
The instrumented fuel elements read higher than 
expected from the earlier analysis. 
Instrumented fuel elements cladding and fuel meat 
gaps must be tighter to ensure that the actual 
readings are more representative of the core 
analysis. 
The correct length should be identified before 
fabrication at CERCA. Cutting the thermocouple 
leads is standard practice, but had it been 
considered ahead of time, the materials and 
capabilities could have been in place onsite to 
significantly reduce the time and effort required. 
Thermocouple leads on the instrumented fuel 
elements were too long for the NSC configuration. 
The NSC cut the leads, but then required a half 
day to re-work the lead wires. 
6.5 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipment 
6.5.1 Cask Determination 
The average survey score was 3.67. 
Issues Recommendations 
The SNF shipment activities are very difficult for 
universities that do not normally ship SNF. 
Updated guidance from NRC regarding SNF 
shipping would be helpful. 
The INL should consider contracting with other 
companies or experienced shippers to help the 
licensees. 
The DOE could consider taking ownership of the 
shipping rather than NRC. 
It is important to field-verify all procedures, plans, 
and such before shipping. 
Not everyone with a need to know had copies of 
the SNF shipping orders, specifically, some 
information needed to be included in shipping 
documents prepared by others. This was caused, 
in part, by a Safeguards Information “blackout” 
for information from NRC. 
Safeguarded Information issues have been 
resolved at NRC. This situation should not occur 
in the future. 
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Issues Recommendations 
The cask was identified much later than 
appropriate by INL. The tardiness of the contract 
with the cask vendor caused delays in the facility 
preparations. This caused unnecessary stress and 
work for NSC. 
The INL needs to make cask arrangements as 
soon as possible. 
The cask vendors need to make detailed site 
assessments early in the project. 
Drawings and procedures need to be supplied to 
the reactor as soon as possible. 
The project should make early visits to the 
university and discuss the tasks associated with 
SNF shipping. 
6.5.2 Transportation Plan/Security Plan 
The average survey score was 3.0. 
Issues Recommendations 
Transport and security plans can be 
time-consuming and labor intensive. 
The project should get the most effective and 
reliable sources to carry out the functions of 
developing the plans. 
Guidance form NRC regarding HEU shipments 
was not as clear or up-to-date as it could have 
been.
The current guidance should be updated. The 
NRC suggests we work with one of the current 
licensees to get better understanding of the current 
regulations.
6.5.3 Route Assessment 
The average survey score was 3.2. 
Issues Recommendations 
Communication about the route assessment 
documents was sometimes inefficient. 
It was suggested to involve other subject matter 
experts during the route assessment. 
Communication lines between all parties 
(i.e., shipper, INL, cask vendor, and other 
facilitating companies) need to be open. 
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6.5.4 Certification of University Quality Assurance Programs 
The average survey score was 3.0. 
Issues Recommendations 
Certifying as an SNF shipper can be extensive. Begin activities early and the program should 
provide assistance to the facility, as needed. 
6.5.5 Facility Preparations for Spent Nuclear Fuel Activities 
The average survey score was 3.60. 
Issues Recommendations 
The SNF shipping preparations are wide-ranging 
and often difficult. 
Need to ensure early, comprehensive planning 
with attention to detail. 
Start the process to procure support equipment 
(e.g., cranes) early. This worked well for us. 
6.5.6 Required Shipping Data Preparation 
The average survey score was 2.5. 
Issues Recommendations 
Required shipping data preparations can be 
laborious and resource intensive. 
Use of the parametric study on TRIGA fuel 
burnups for completing the required shipping data 
radioisotope and decay heat tables would be very 
effective.
The university may need to check and validate the 
applicability of the standard decay heat data. 
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6.5.7 Shipping Documentation 
The average survey score was 3.0. 
Issues Recommendations 
Shipping documentation, such as SNF 
Transportation Plans and the Bill of Lading, were 
very involved for an unfamiliar shipper. 
The INL’s help was invaluable. The university 
always felt that they had an ally and 
knowledgeable resource to facilitate the process. 
The project university also had confidence in the 
experts and could trust their advice and 
experience during document development. 
6.5.8 Cask Loading 
The average survey score was 3.67. 
Issues Recommendations 
The SNF roles and responsibilities were well 
defined going into the SNF shipping activities. 
The NSC had been informed early in the project 
that they were in charge and responsible for the 
activities. All other entities also understood this at 
the outset of the project. This hierarchy resulted in 
effective working relationships between the 
project entities. 
We need to maintain this level of rigor and 
discipline for future conversion projects. 
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Issues Recommendations 
The cask sat loaded at NSC over the weekend. 
This was an unfavorable situation for the shipper. 
Many notifications and logistics have to be 
worked out for the moment the shipment leaves 
the facility. Changes to planned shipping dates are 
difficult if not impossible to effect. The SNF 
loading was to begin on Monday. It was estimated 
that loading would take about 5 days to complete, 
thereby finishing on Friday. Weekends are not the 
preferred times to start shipments; therefore, the 
INL shipping coordinator felt that it was best to 
leave the weekend for schedule contingency in the 
case loading took longer than expected. 
The project needs to fully communicate this 
thinking and the firm shipping dates for the 
university. 
In future shipments, the project needs to consider 
the trade-off between shipping on a weekend or 
leaving the loaded cask at the facility for the 
weekend.
6.5.9 Receipt Facility Preparation 
The average survey score was 3.33. 
Issues Recommendations 
It needs to be clearly established, well in advance 
of the cask loading dates, who is responsible for 
planning and executing the tasks for all legs of the 
shipments. This includes equipment shipment to 
and from the various facilities. 
There was some confusion on who was making 
arrangements for the return shipments of the 
Nuclear Assurance Corporation equipment. Just 
days before the shipment, it was found that the 
arrangement for a truck had not been made. 
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6.6 Other issues 
6.6.1 Safeguards Information 
The average survey score was 3.0. 
Issues Recommendations 
There was a bit of confusion regarding what 
constitutes safeguards information and who can 
have access to it. 
The various entities involved with the project 
need to clearly understand their responsibilities 
and limitation under this order. The project should 
consider holding an onsite meeting to clarify the 
policies with the project team. 
7. ROUND ROBIN 
In concluding the discussion of the lessons learned, all participants were invited to reiterate, 
summarize, or offer any other lessons learned. The following list provides their final thoughts: 
x Well defined goals and responsibilities are essential to success. All team members must understand 
their responsibilities. Because of division of responsibilities at INL, it was confusing to NSC who 
at INL was in charge of some tasks. 
x It is important for the project team to understand that if a task can be done early then it should be. 
Performing tasks just-in-time would have caused the NSC conversion to fail because of 
unexpected, last-minute tasks and issues. In other words, completing tasks early will allow the 
project to be flexible enough to address the last minute challenges. 
x The NSC project went well in spite of the minor setbacks and challenges. The project will be held 
to a higher standard of performance next time. 
x There will be some weeks/months after the project where parties will need to work together to get 
some things accomplished and review present issues of conversion. 
x The next lessons learned analysis needs to include a specific “what went well” column so that we 
can capture the things that worked. 
CONCLUSION
This lessons learned process has allowed us to capture gaps, opportunities, and good practices, 
drawing from the project team’s experiences. The process is inclusive and offers an opportunity for every 
entity that “touched” the project to share from its experience. These lessons will be used to raise the 
standard of excellence, effectiveness, and efficiency in all future conversion projects. Despite making 
improvements to successive projects by addressing the lessons we have learned on this project, 
conducting a lessons learned activity will be vital to each conversion project as technologies, regulations, 
and other aspects of the environment change and influence success. It is recognized we cannot become 
complacent, nor adopt a mindset that the process has been “perfected.” 
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